[EDITORIAL REPORT]

The U.S. solar energy industry has been profoundly shaped by tariffs introduced during the Trump administration. Beginning in 2018, the government imposed broad import duties on solar panels and related equipment, aiming to protect American manufacturers from low-priced foreign competition​​. These measures – chiefly a four-year, gradually declining 30% safeguard tariff on imported crystalline silicon solar modules – reverberated across the renewable energy sector.

As of 2025, many of these tariffs (some extended or modified under the Biden administration) remain in effect, and their impacts are now clearer with several years of data and industry experience.

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of how the tariffs have affected U.S. renewable energy markets, with a specific focus on the solar panel industry. It examines the consequences for utility-scale and residential solar segments, project costs and deployment timelines, international supply chains, domestic manufacturing efforts, jobs and investment, global market dynamics, individual companies, and the perspectives of policymakers and industry stakeholders.

Throughout, we integrate recent developments up to 2025 – including policy adjustments and market responses – to offer an up-to-date evaluation. The goal is to inform a policy-aware U.S. audience about the multifaceted outcomes of the tariff policy on solar energy’s growth and competitiveness.

 

 

Overview of the Solar Tariffs and Trade Measures

In January 2018, President Trump approved new tariffs on imported solar cells and modules under Section 201 of the Trade Act​. The tariff was set at 30% in the first year (2018) and scheduled to step down to 25% in 2019, 20% in 2020, and 15% in 2021, expiring thereafter​. A quota allowed the first 2.5 gigawatts (GW) of imported solar cells each year to enter tariff-free to ensure U.S. panel assemblers could still source some cells​.

These safeguard tariffs came on top of existing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties from 2012-2014 that already targeted Chinese and Taiwanese solar products, which had largely driven direct imports from China out of the U.S. market​​. In fact, by the time the 2018 tariffs hit, Chinese firms had begun shifting production to other Asian countries to circumvent earlier duties​. The new Trump-era tariffs, however, applied globally – including to key suppliers in Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea, which by then were major sources of solar modules for the United States.

Not long after, additional tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act imposed a separate 25% duty on many Chinese exports, including solar components, further aiming to penalize China​. Together, these policies marked the opening of a broader trade war in clean energy goods, justified by findings that surging imports were a “substantial cause of serious injury” to U.S. manufacturers​.

The tariffs were controversial from the start. Proponents – including the few remaining U.S. solar panel manufacturers – argued that tariffs would create a “level playing field” and give domestic producers a chance to scale up production after years of factory closures due to cheaper imports​​.

The Trump administration cast the move as defending American industries and workers: “The President’s action makes clear that the Trump Administration will always defend American workers… and businesses in this regard,” stated U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer​.

Opponents, led by the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) and solar installation companies, warned that tariffs on panels would raise prices, stall projects, and cost far more jobs in installation and downstream sectors than they might create in manufacturing​​. SEIA projected in early 2018 that the decision would trigger the loss of roughly 23,000 American jobs in that year alone and lead to the delay or cancellation of billions of dollars in solar investments​.

They noted that at the end of 2016, around 38,000 Americans worked in solar manufacturing, but only 2,000 of those jobs were at cell or module makers – the rest were in producing racking, inverters, and other equipment that rely on a healthy installation market.

Tariffs risked “creating a crisis in a part of our economy that has been thriving,” SEIA’s CEO Abigail Ross Hopper said, arguing the policy “will not create adequate cell or module manufacturing to meet U.S. demand… [and] will ultimately cost tens of thousands of hard-working, blue-collar Americans their jobs”​.

This fundamental debate – protect nascent domestic manufacturing versus preserve affordability and deployment momentum – set the stage for how these tariffs have played out in practice through 2025.

Over the ensuing years, tariff policy saw several adjustments. A midterm review by the U.S. International Trade Commission in 2019 left the core tariffs in place but fueled discussion on exclusions (for example, whether to exempt newer technologies like bifacial panels).

In February 2022, the Biden administration elected to extend the solar panel tariffs for another four years (through 2026) but with significant modifications to soften their impact​​. Notably, bifacial solar panels (which produce power on both sides and are now widely used in utility-scale projects) were excluded from the extended tariff, and the import quota for tariff-free solar cells was doubled from 2.5 GW to 5 GW per year​.

These changes came as a relief to developers, since bifacial modules had become “dominant among big U.S. projects” by then​. At the same time, the administration opened the door for more duty-free panel supplies from allies like Canada and Mexico (previously negligible sources)​. This balancing act was intended to satisfy two important constituencies: labor and domestic manufacturers, who wanted continued import protections, and clean energy developers, who needed cheaper, abundant panels for project expansion​.

Tensions remained – U.S. panel makers condemned the bifacial exemption and higher cell quota, arguing these steps diluted the intent of the safeguard​. Auxin Solar’s CEO, whose company had lobbied for an extension, said the tariff’s value was reduced “to not much more than the paper it is written on” by these concessions​. First Solar, the largest U.S. solar manufacturer, likewise criticized the move, saying it “effectively allows China to outflank American efforts to grow self-reliant solar supply chains”​.

Meanwhile, renewable energy trade groups applauded the tariff exclusions as “a win for jobs and a win for the President’s climate agenda”, emphasizing that most sector employment is in installation, not manufacturing​​.

Another major trade development came in 2022: the U.S. Department of Commerce launched an anti-circumvention investigation into whether Chinese companies were routing solar products through Southeast Asia to evade duties​. This was prompted by a petition from Auxin Solar and threatened to slap retroactive tariffs on imports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia – the very countries that by now supplied about 80% of U.S. solar modules​​.

The prospect of hefty new tariffs caused an uproar in the industry and the delay of many projects (as detailed later). In response, President Biden in June 2022 took emergency action: he issued a 24-month moratorium on any new solar tariffs stemming from this investigation​. This effectively paused additional duties on Southeast Asian panels until at least mid-2024, providing a “bridge” for solar installers to keep importing while domestic manufacturing ramps up under new incentives.

President Biden also invoked the Defense Production Act to spur more U.S. manufacturing of solar equipment​. The tariff pause was controversial in its own right – it was challenged by some bipartisan lawmakers who argued it undermined American producers – but Biden vetoed a congressional attempt to overturn it, stating that reinstating tariffs during that period would “create deep uncertainty for American businesses and workers in the solar industry” and “bet against American innovation”​.

As a result, as of 2025, the original Trump tariffs (extended and modified) remain in place alongside a temporary freeze on new import penalties for Southeast Asian panels, all while generous incentives from the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) are now encouraging domestic solar manufacturing. This complex landscape makes it important to assess the real-world outcomes of the tariffs so far.

The following sections analyze these outcomes in detail, covering how the tariffs have impacted different segments of the solar market, the cost and pace of project development, global supply chains, U.S. manufacturing capacity, jobs and investments, international competitiveness, and company-level fortunes. Each aspect reveals a piece of the larger puzzle of how trade policy and clean energy transition interact in the United States.

 

Impact on Utility-Scale Solar Projects

Utility-scale solar – large installations supplying power to the grid – has been most sensitive to the panel tariffs. These big projects operate on thin margins per kilowatt-hour and compete directly with other generation sources, so even modest cost increases can influence their viability.

Because solar modules typically account for a significant share (around one-third) of utility-scale project costs, a 30% import tariff on modules had a noticeable effect on total project economics​. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that the initial 30% tariff in 2018 would raise overall capital costs for new utility-scale PV installations by roughly 10%​. In practice, utility solar developers reacted swiftly: some projects were delayed, re-priced, or canceled in anticipation of higher costs.

Just a few months after the tariff took effect, one of the nation’s largest solar farm developers, Cypress Creek Renewables, announced it was cancelling or freezing 1.5 GW of planned solar capacity (worth about $1.5 billion in investment) because the tariff had made those projects uneconomical​​. “Because utility-scale solar is extremely price-sensitive, the tariff forced us to re-evaluate some of our projects,” a Cypress Creek spokesman explained at the time​. This was emblematic of a broader trend: in mid-2018 SEIA compiled data showing more than $2.5 billion in utility-scale solar projects were being shelved nationwide due to the tariff-induced spike in panel prices​​.

Project timelines in the utility segment also shifted. Many developers opted to postpone construction start dates so that their projects would come online in later years when the tariff rate would be lower. For example, after the initial shock and policy uncertainty of early 2018 passed, a surge of power purchase agreements (PPAs) for utility solar was signed – 13.2 GW of new utility-scale solar contracts were signed in 2018, according to Wood Mackenzie, but most of those projects planned for completion after the tariff steps down or expires​.

The contracted pipeline of utility projects hit a record 25 GW by late 2018 as developers lined up deals for the early 2020s, essentially betting on future lower panel costs​. This strategic delay was reflected in installation figures: utility-scale PV buildout slowed in 2018, with the segment seeing a slight contraction compared to 2017​. Some 6.2 GW of utility solar was installed in 2018 (about 8% less than the prior year)​​, a dip attributed in part to “Section 201 tariff uncertainty earlier in the year and shifting project timelines based on the tariff schedule”​.

In other words, the tariff caused a temporary lull; developers did not abandon solar en masse but rather pushed certain projects into later years, smoothing out the near-term growth curve that had been steeply upward before.

By 2019 and 2020, as the tariff rate declined to 25% and 20%, utility-scale installations resumed growth, aided also by declining non-module costs and the rush to take advantage of federal tax credits before their phasedown.

However, the impact of the tariffs did not fully dissipate. Analysts noted that U.S. utility solar prices remained somewhat higher than they would have been otherwise, which in turn made solar less competitive in marginal markets. The U.S. solar market has had some of the highest hardware costs globally during the tariff period, because while panel prices continued falling in Europe and Asia, in the U.S. the decline was “softened” by the import duties​.

Reuters reported that by late 2019, U.S. solar prices were among the highest in the world, making it more difficult for solar to compete with alternatives like wind and natural gas in some regions​. SEIA specifically pointed out that the tariffs had the greatest chilling effect in emerging solar states with tight economics – for instance, Alabama, the Dakotas, and Kansas – where a 10% project cost increase can render solar deals uncompetitive​. In such places, utility commissioners or buyers might reject solar projects that would have been viable if panel costs were as low as the global average.

Thus, the tariffs likely slowed the geographic expansion of utility-scale solar into certain new markets.

It is important to note that multiple factors affect utility solar growth, and by 2020-2021 other forces (like the COVID-19 pandemic and supply chain bottlenecks) also disrupted project timelines. But even into 2022, trade policy continued to cast a shadow. Early that year, when the Commerce Department’s anti-circumvention tariff investigation loomed, utility-scale solar development nearly ground to a halt: from January to June 2022, about 20% of planned utility PV capacity additions were delayed, and actual installations in that first half were less than half of what was projected​​.

EIA data shows that solar developers put an average of 4.4 GW of utility projects on hold each month in H1 2022 – a sharp increase in delays compared to 2021 – largely due to trade policy uncertainty and equipment supply fears​​.

Many utility projects scheduled for 2022 slipped into 2023 as developers awaited resolution of the tariff issue​. President Biden’s two-year tariff moratorium in June 2022 provided relief, and by later in 2023 the utility-scale sector started to rebound strongly, supercharged by the new climate law incentives. But the episode underscored how sensitive utility solar deployment is to import policy: when the availability or cost of panels is in doubt, large projects can’t move forward.

Even as of 2025, utility-scale solar developers are navigating the tail end of the tariff pause (set to expire in mid-2024) and hoping for clarity on whether new import duties will return. The longer-term effect is that some utilities have diversified procurement or sought more domestic panel supply deals to reduce vulnerability to international trade gyrations.

 

Impact on Residential and Distributed Solar

In contrast to utility-scale projects, the residential solar market – rooftop installations on homes – has been more resilient to the panel tariffs. Residential solar system costs are dominated by “soft costs” like labor, permitting, marketing, and installer margins, with the PV modules themselves typically making up only around 25-30% of the total installed cost for a home system​.

Consequently, a tariff-driven increase in module prices has a diluted effect on the overall cost of going solar for homeowners.

The EIA calculated that the 2018 tariffs would raise the cost of installing a residential solar system by roughly 4% on average, compared to the ~10% impact in utility-scale​. In practice, industry analysts estimated the tariffs added on the order of only $0.10-$0.15 per watt to residential solar prices initially​ – about a 3-4% increase in the price of a typical rooftop system​. Solar installers were often able to absorb or mitigate this small increase through bulk purchasing and modest pricing adjustments.

For instance, major national installers like Sunrun and Vivint Solar indicated they had stockpiled inventory or locked in panel supplies in advance, insulating themselves and their customers from short-term price spikes​. Some companies shifted to sourcing panels from tariff-exempt countries or negotiated discounts from suppliers sharing the tariff burden.

Additionally, ongoing declines in other component costs (like inverters and racking) and efficiency improvements in installation helped offset the higher module costs​.

As a result, residential solar growth continued largely unabated. After a brief stall in 2017 (due to an unrelated market contraction when a federal tax credit was initially set to expire), the U.S. residential solar segment actually grew 7% in 2018, installing more systems than the year before​​.

By Q4 2018, the residential sector had its biggest quarter in two years, signaling that the market had adapted to the new status quo​. Homeowners’ demand for solar – driven by factors like high utility rates, state incentives, and interest in energy independence – remained strong enough that a slight price increase of a few hundred dollars per installation did not deter purchases in core markets.

In fact, installers in California and other leading states often found customers relatively insensitive to minor cost changes, given that financing options (loans/leases) spread the upfront cost over many years. The monthly payment for a financed rooftop system saw very little change due to the tariff, meaning solar offerings remained attractive compared to utility bills.

That said, the tariffs may have had a subtler impact on residential solar in secondary markets. In states where solar economics were borderline or depended on slim savings, any cost increase can slow adoption.

Some smaller installers operating on tight margins reported that they had to pass costs to customers or reduce their own profits, which could have constrained their growth or ability to hire. Nationwide solar job figures did show a dip in 2018, which industry advocates partly attributed to the tariffs’ ripple effects on rooftop companies.

According to The Solar Foundation’s annual jobs census, solar employment fell by 3.2% in 2018 (the second year of modest decline after rapid growth up to 2016), before rebounding in 2019. Still, it’s hard to isolate the tariff effect in residential given other factors like policy changes in key states (for example, net metering reforms). Overall, residential solar proved relatively robust. Even SEIA, while opposing the tariffs, noted that the initial duties “won’t set the solar industry back irreparably”​.

By 2020 and beyond, the dominant drivers for home solar became the declining federal tax credit (creating incentive to install sooner) and new consumer interests such as pairing solar with battery storage – overshadowing the minor cost adder from tariffs.

It’s also worth noting the commercial (non-residential distributed) solar segment, such as solar on commercial buildings and community solar farms. This mid-scale market saw an 8% decline in installations in 2018​, although analysts attributed that mainly to specific state policy shifts (e.g. changes in California’s rates and incentives) rather than the import tariff.

Commercial systems, like residential, have significant non-panel costs, so the tariff’s impact was intermediate – estimated around a 6% increase in project cost for 2018 installations​. Some larger corporate solar buyers did delay projects to see if panel prices would stabilize. But by 2019, the commercial segment stabilized as well.

In summary, tariffs hit hardest at utility-scale solar, had moderate impact on commercial installations, and only marginal effect on residential solar uptake. This differing sensitivity across segments influenced where the solar market’s growth was dampened versus where it continued on track.

 

Effects on Solar Project Costs, Timelines, and Installations

Tariffs on imported panels translated directly into higher material costs for solar projects, which in turn affected project budgets and schedules. Project Costs: For utility-scale projects initiated in 2018, developers saw module procurement costs jump significantly. Solar module prices that had been in the range of ~$0.35 per watt for utility buyers rose by an estimated $0.10–$0.15/W due to the 30% tariff​.

This means a 100 MW solar farm could face $10–$15 million in extra module costs. In competitive power markets, such an increase often had to be absorbed by negotiating lower land costs, thinner developer margins, or passing costs through in power sales agreements – none of which were easy.

Many projects that were in early planning became financially unviable and were cancelled or put on hold. SEIA reported that the tariffs caused the cancellation of over 10.5 GW of solar installations (utility and commercial), representing roughly $8–$9.5 million of lost investment for every MW not built​. In dollar terms, by late 2019 SEIA tallied $19 billion in investment loss due to the tariffs, relative to a scenario with free trade​. This investment shortfall corresponds to solar projects that would have gone forward if panels had remained cheaper​.

The lost 10.5 GW of generation is enough to power about 1.8 million American homes​ – a significant setback in renewable deployment at a time when scaling clean energy is critical.

Installers secure solar panels on a rooftop in Florida. Tariff-driven price increases were modest for residential and commercial solar, but utility-scale projects faced larger cost hikes, leading some developers to delay or cancel installations.​​

Beyond pure cost, timelines and installations were heavily influenced by tariff dynamics. In the immediate aftermath of the tariff announcement, a rush occurred to import and stockpile panels before the duties kicked in.

Many developers had pre-ordered shipments in late 2017, effectively front-loading some supply. This created a brief glut of panels in early 2018 that partially buffered near-term projects. However, once that inventory was used, projects slated for late 2018 or 2019 had to either pay the tariffs or wait.

As noted, numerous utility projects chose to wait – pushing their online dates to 2020–2022 when tariffs would be lower. This led to a dip in installations in 2018 (total U.S. solar installations fell 2% from the previous year, the first decline in decades)​. Wood Mackenzie explicitly observed that developers timed projects to the tariff step-down, resulting in a smaller 2018 and a catch-up later​. By 2019, annual solar installation counts resumed an upward trajectory, albeit somewhat behind what they might have been without tariffs. SEIA estimated that between 2017 and 2021, the solar industry ended up installing 10.5 GW less capacity than it would have in the absence of the tariffs, a roughly 13% reduction in cumulative deployments​​.

The lag in installations also meant lost emissions reductions and clean energy generation – effectively a climate opportunity cost of the trade policy. One analysis noted that the foregone solar deployments correspond to about 26 million metric tons of CO2 emissions that were not avoided (since those solar projects did not displace fossil generation)​.

Project timelines were further disrupted in the 2020–2022 period by the aforementioned Commerce Department tariff probe. The mere threat of retroactive tariffs of 50–250% on panels from Southeast Asia was described by solar CEOs as having a “devastating” impact on project pipelines.

In the first half of 2022, major developers like NextEra Energy and Avangrid announced delays in dozens of large solar projects because suppliers were unwilling to ship panels that might later incur huge duties. EIA documented that each month in early 2022 saw over 4 GW of solar capacity delays, nearly double the normal rate​​. For the full year 2022, solar installations fell to an estimated 15.7 GW, the lowest since 2019, primarily because so many utility projects slipped to 2023 due to supply uncertainty​​.

Only after the tariff moratorium and clarity that IRA incentives would improve economics did the logjam break. In 2023 and 2024, the industry experienced record growth – with nearly 50 GW installed in 2024 according to preliminary figures – essentially making up for the tariff-induced shortfall in prior years​​.

But this catch-up does not erase the delays in climate progress and the regional economic activity that were sacrificed in the interim.

In summary, the tariffs increased solar project costs, causing many utility-scale developments to be deferred or scrapped, which translated to a slower pace of installations in the late 2010s than would have occurred otherwise. Residential and commercial installers navigated the cost increase with minimal schedule disruption, but the utility segment – the workhorse of new solar capacity – saw a significant, if temporary, dampening of growth. Only with time, market adjustments, and new pro-solar policies did the industry reaccelerate to previous levels.

The installation “gap” created by the tariffs is still evident in cumulative capacity charts, though the U.S. is now back on a steep growth trajectory thanks to falling costs (excluding tariffs) and robust demand for clean energy.

Whether the tariffs ultimately just delayed installations or permanently eliminated some potential projects is a matter of perspective, but it is clear there was a near-term cost to deployment momentum during the tariff years.

 

Supply Chain Consequences: China, Southeast Asia, and Import Dependence

A core rationale for the Trump solar tariffs was to reduce America’s dependence on imports – particularly from China – and encourage a domestic supply chain. In practice, while direct imports from China did collapse, the U.S. solar industry remained heavily dependent on foreign supply, with manufacturing simply shifting to other Asian countries. Chinese solar manufacturers, who dominate the global industry, adapted by rerouting their supply chains through neighboring countries.

As Reuters succinctly observed, for every round of U.S. tariffs over the past decade, Chinese companies found a workaround to “keep their products flowing into the United States”​​.

After the Obama-era duties in 2012-2014, Chinese firms began using factories in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand; and when the 2018 Trump tariffs hit all imported panels, those same countries – which were not subject to separate anti-dumping tariffs – became the main production hubs serving the U.S. market​​.

The numbers tell the story clearly. In 2017, about 50% of U.S. solar module imports still came directly from China​. But once the 2018 global tariffs and the Section 301 China-specific tariffs took effect, China’s share of U.S. solar imports plummeted to near-zero – falling below 1% by 2018​. By 2019, Chinese-made panels had virtually vanished from U.S. import logs​. However, shipments from Southeast Asia surged.

Chinese manufacturers had already established affiliated plants or partnerships in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand, and these facilities ramped up output to serve U.S. demand despite the tariffs (the 201 tariffs applied to them too, but they often had slightly higher cost structures that could absorb some tariff cost, and they benefited from Chinese parent companies’ economies of scale). By 2021-2022, roughly 80%–85% of all solar panels installed in the United States were imported from Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, or Cambodia.

In fact, U.S. solar imports from those four countries hit a record $12 billion in 2023, four times the level of 2019, as developers rushed to build projects with panels from these sources​. This shift underscores that the supply chain realignment was already well underway; the tariff did not on its own bring manufacturing back from Asia, but rather solidified Southeast Asia as the supplier instead of China directly.

It’s notable that the 201 tariffs did exempt certain developing countries up to a quota, but major cell/module manufacturing nations in Asia were either too large to qualify or quickly exceeded the quotas.

Countries like South Korea and Canada initially hoped for exemptions but ended up being subject to tariffs (Canada even filed a complaint under NAFTA, given its role as an ally). In the end, virtually all imported panels faced the U.S. tariff – but imports continued unabated, just from different locales. By 2021, a bizarre dynamic had emerged: the United States was installing more solar than ever, but importing 95–99% of the modules to do so​​.

Less than 1% of panels came from outside Asia​, illustrating a near-total dependency on Asian manufacturing despite the trade barriers.

This supply chain dependence carried risks. The arrangement worked as long as Southeast Asian factories could meet demand and weren’t themselves targeted by trade measures. But as soon as the Commerce Department questioned this arrangement as potential tariff circumvention, the industry was thrown into chaos (as described earlier).

Essentially, the U.S. had created a solar supply chain heavily routed through four countries, all sourcing materials from China, meaning any disruption – whether tariffs, pandemic lockdowns, or shipping issues – in that chain could bottleneck U.S. solar deployment. Indeed, 2020-2021 saw additional supply challenges: the pandemic caused shipping container shortages and higher freight costs, and a polysilicon supply crunch (partly due to a fire at a Chinese factory and China’s own soaring solar demand) drove up global panel prices.

Because the U.S. lacks domestic alternative suppliers at scale, it had to weather these storms with limited leverage. In mid-2021, the U.S. also implemented the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, effectively banning imports of solar products linked to China’s Xinjiang region (a major polysilicon source), which led U.S. Customs to detain numerous panel shipments from Malaysia and other countries that used Chinese polysilicon. This further snarled the supply chain and delayed projects​​.

In effect, the tariffs didn’t insulate the U.S. from Chinese supply chain issues; they arguably increased exposure by concentrating sourcing through a few channels.

From China’s perspective, the U.S. tariffs barely dented its solar manufacturing dominance globally. In 2023, China’s share of worldwide solar panel production hit about 80%, an astonishing figure, with another ~15-17% coming from Chinese-affiliated factories in Southeast Asia​​.

Two decades earlier, the U.S. had 13% of global solar manufacturing, but now the U.S. accounts for a trivial fraction (only a couple percent at most)​. China ramped up its capacity even as it lost direct U.S. sales, simply exporting more to other regions and using its excess supply to lower prices and capture emerging markets. The oversupply of panels in 2018 – partly due to China cutting its own solar subsidies that year – caused a flood of cheap panels on the world market that kept global prices falling despite the U.S. tariff​.

In short, the Trump tariffs alone were not enough to alter China’s trajectory or the fundamental structure of the solar supply chain. Chinese firms “sidestepped” the tariffs by manufacturing in tariff-exempt locations and continued to maintain a cost advantage​​.

This led some observers to call the U.S. approach “whack-a-mole” – each time a tariff hits, production pops up elsewhere.

One consequence of this is that U.S. installers paid higher prices, but much of that price premium didn’t go to American workers – it went to covering tariff costs or was absorbed by foreign suppliers. Some Chinese-owned manufacturers may have absorbed a portion of the tariff to keep their products attractive (effectively transferring some tariff revenue from U.S. importers to the U.S. Treasury). But overall, the policy resulted in the U.S. solar industry paying billions more for modules and still sending those dollars abroad rather than to a domestic supply chain. In that sense, it was an inefficient way to try to rebalance trade.

The supply chain dependence also had strategic implications that policymakers noted. The USTR’s 2018 fact sheet acknowledged that “China dominates the global [solar] supply chain” and was planning to expand to 70% of global capacity at that time​. While tariffs aimed to stall that dominance in the U.S. market, critics argue they did nothing to address upstream dependencies like polysilicon and wafers, which China also controls, nor downstream issues like inverter supply (which also often comes from China or Asia, subject to other tariffs).

In fact, China retaliated against the 2012 U.S. solar tariffs by imposing tariffs on U.S.-made polysilicon, crippling the American polysilicon industry (leading to layoffs at factories in Washington state and Montana)​​. Those retaliatory measures remained unresolved through the Trump years, meaning the U.S. polysilicon producers lost access to China’s market (the world’s largest), further entwining the supply chain challenge. It wasn’t until the IRA’s passage in 2022 that the U.S. offered significant incentives to build a domestic upstream (like new polysilicon, ingot, and wafer plants) to complement any panel assembly efforts.

In summary, the tariffs rearranged but did not truly secure the solar supply chain for the U.S. Direct imports from China were largely eliminated, but Chinese companies via proxy countries remained the backbone of U.S. solar equipment supply. Southeast Asia became the manufacturing hub for U.S.-bound modules, which kept solar flowing but also concentrated risk. The episode highlights that tariffs alone, without parallel industrial strategy, had limited success in building a self-reliant supply chain.

As of 2025, addressing this remains a top concern: policymakers now emphasize onshoring critical parts of the solar value chain using incentives (the approach of the Biden administration’s IRA) rather than tariffs alone. The coming years will test whether those measures can finally shift the U.S. away from near-total import dependence – a dependency that the Trump tariffs tried, but largely failed, to break.

 

Influence on U.S. Manufacturing and Industry Capacity

One of the explicit goals of the Trump administration’s solar tariffs was to revive U.S. solar manufacturing – particularly the production of solar cells and modules on American soil. The question is: did it work? The answer is mixed. The tariffs did spur some new investments in domestic panel assembly, but they fell far short of creating an end-to-end solar manufacturing renaissance, and the U.S. remained a minor player in global production through 2025.

On the positive side, the tariffs provided a strong market signal that the U.S. government was willing to shield manufacturers from some foreign price competition. This assurance led several foreign solar companies to set up or expand module assembly plants in the United States. Notably, in 2018 and 2019: Hanwha Q CELLS (South Korea) built a large module factory in Georgia (capacity ~1.7 GW/year); JinkoSolar (China) opened a module assembly plant in Florida (around 400 MW/year); and LG Electronics (South Korea) established a new panel assembly line in Alabama (500 MW/year)​.

These facilities were directly prompted by the tariff – by manufacturing in the U.S., these companies could avoid tariffs and appeal to customers seeking “Made in USA” panels. SunPower Corp, a U.S.-based company that primarily manufactured overseas, acquired the struggling SolarWorld Americas factory in Oregon in 2018, aiming to produce some high-efficiency panels domestically (SunPower also successfully lobbied for an exemption from tariffs on its unique interdigitated back-contact panels, aiding its pivot)​.

First Solar, the thin-film module manufacturer headquartered in Arizona, was not subject to the Section 201 tariffs (which only applied to crystalline silicon technology), but it still benefited from the higher market prices the tariff created.

Flush with improved margins, First Solar invested $400 million in a new manufacturing plant in Ohio, which opened in 2019, and later announced further expansions​. Smaller U.S. companies like Suniva and SolarTech Universal hoped to restart or expand production as well, though with limited success.

According to the U.S. International Trade Commission’s review, the Section 201 tariffs were “sufficient to boost some U.S. module manufacturing” – effectively, the U.S. module assembly capacity roughly tripled from 2017 to 2021​. Before the tariffs, U.S. capacity for making solar panels was only around 2 GW per year; by 2021, it reached about 7 GW per year of module production​.

This growth is significant and directly attributable to the new factories by Q CELLS, Jinko, and others​. With 7 GW of capacity, the U.S. was making more panels than it had in many years, creating a few thousand manufacturing jobs in the process. SEIA estimated about 1,200 jobs were added in panel manufacturing between 2017 and 2019 (though exact figures vary). Companies like Hanwha Q CELLS became major employers in states like Georgia thanks to these plants.

However, this boost must be put in context: U.S. solar installations in 2021 were over 20 GW, meaning domestic production (7 GW) could only meet roughly one-third of domestic demand​. By 2022, installations exceeded 20 GW even in a down year, widening that gap further​. In other words, even after the tariff-induced expansion, U.S. manufacturing was nowhere near self-sufficient – the vast majority of solar panels still had to be imported to make up the shortfall​​.

Moreover, the tariffs did not manage to establish upstream manufacturing. The United States essentially had no solar cell production by 2021 (Panasonic had been making cells with Tesla in Buffalo, but that line shut down in 2020; Suniva’s cell production never fully restarted)​.

So the new U.S. module plants were mostly assembling imported cells. In fact, the Trump tariffs’ cell quota of 2.5 GW, which Biden later raised to 5 GW, was a recognition that U.S. assemblers needed foreign cells to function​​. The result was an odd supply chain where even “made in USA” panels might contain 60-70% Asian value (the cells, wafers, etc.), limiting the domestic job creation and value-add.

Domestic production of wafers, ingots, and other components remained essentially zero through 2025 outside of one small pilot facility. True vertical integration did not take root.

Notably, the two companies that petitioned for the tariffs – Suniva and SolarWorld – did not experience a triumphant comeback. SolarWorld USA was acquired by SunPower in 2018, and while SunPower continued making some panels in Oregon for a few years, it shut down that plant by 2021 as it restructured its business (spinning off manufacturing to a new entity, Maxeon, which produces overseas)​.

Suniva, which had gone bankrupt in 2017, remained largely dormant; attempts to revive its Georgia factory fell through despite the tariff protection. This underscores that the troubles those firms faced went beyond cheap imports – they had technological and operational challenges that tariffs couldn’t fix​​. First Solar, by contrast, thrived – but it was a unique case: its thin-film modules were not directly under the tariff and already competitively priced, yet it benefited from the general market tightening.

First Solar’s workforce and output expanded, and it became a vocal supporter of extending the tariffs to maintain a favorable competitive environment​.

Domestic manufacturers did enjoy a period of better pricing power. Industry reports indicate the tariffs “softened” price declines, meaning U.S. module selling prices were higher than they would have been otherwise​.

This likely improved the profit margins for companies like First Solar and any U.S. producers, at least until global prices caught up. However, it’s also noted that the tariffs did not lead to a dramatic price increase for U.S.-made panels – competition and technological advances still pushed costs down, just not as steeply as in the rest of the world. By the end of the tariff’s initial term in 2021, module prices (excluding tariffs) had continued to fall globally.

Thus U.S. manufacturers had to keep improving efficiency; they couldn’t simply raise prices by the full tariff amount, or they’d lose all buyers. In some sense, the tariff gave a temporary margin boost and a window to scale, but it was not sufficient on its own to overcome Asia’s massive cost advantage.

The ability of U.S. manufacturing to scale up remained constrained by several factors. One was uncertainty – tariffs last only so long and can be politically reversed. Investing hundreds of millions in new factories is risky if protection might lapse. Indeed, by late 2021, domestic producers (including Auxin, Hanwha, and others) were lobbying hard for an extension of the Section 201 tariffs and higher quotas, signaling they still couldn’t compete head-to-head with imports​. They cited headwinds like the economic fallout of the pandemic and the fact that foreign rivals had stockpiled inventory before the tariffs (dampening their effect)​. The Biden administration’s compromise extension – with exemptions – disappointed them.

For example, First Solar complained that excluding bifacial modules (which compete with its product) would allow a flood of tariff-free imports and “effectively a loophole for Chinese-owned companies”​​. This highlights a challenge: as technology evolved, the tariff regime quickly became outdated (bifacial panels were a niche in 2018 but mainstream by 2022, yet initially not exempted, causing legal battles until they were). Adapting trade policy to tech changes is slow and created openings that reduced the tariffs’ help to U.S. firms.

Another factor was that tariffs alone don’t address the fundamental cost differential. Asian manufacturers benefit from massive scale, integrated supply chains, and in China’s case, government subsidies and lower labor/capital costs.

A 30% tariff narrowed the gap but didn’t erase it. When the tariff stepped down to 15% by 2021, many foreign panels were still cheaper than what nascent U.S. factories could produce. Thus, without additional support, some new U.S. operations struggled. For instance, LG decided in 2022 to exit the solar panel business entirely (including closing its Alabama plant) due to global competitive pressures.

Tesla/Panasonic’s much-touted Buffalo gigafactory never achieved meaningful output of solar cells and pivoted away. The lesson learned was that the U.S. needed deeper incentives to truly scale manufacturing – which came in 2022 with the IRA’s generous production credits (e.g. a tax credit of ~7 cents per watt for U.S.-made panels, and credits for other components). Those measures are now prompting a new wave of factory announcements (for example, Q CELLS plans a fully integrated supply chain in Georgia, First Solar is building its fourth U.S. factory, and startups like CubicPV and Enel announced U.S. cell manufacturing plans). But these are driven by the carrot of subsidies more than the stick of tariffs.

In fact, a Columbia University analysis noted that tariffs without domestic investment incentives led to limited and fragile gains, whereas coupling them with industrial policy could yield more robust results​​.

The ITC’s conclusion in its midterm review was telling: it said the tariffs were still “necessary” to prevent injury to U.S. solar manufacturers as of end-2021​, implying that the domestic industry had not yet matured to stand on its own.

President Biden agreed with that in opting for an extension (albeit modified)​. By 2025, thanks to the IRA, U.S. manufacturing prospects are brighter – planned capacity could exceed 20 GW by 2026 if all announced projects come to fruition, covering a much larger share of demand. But these developments are a result of post-2022 policy.

During the Trump tariff period (2018-2021), U.S. solar manufacturing saw a modest uptick in module assembly, no growth in critical upstream segments, and ultimately continued reliance on imports for the bulk of components. The tariffs did save or create a few manufacturing facilities that likely would not exist otherwise (preventing complete collapse of the sector), but they did not achieve energy independence in solar hardware.

It’s also worth mentioning that while solar panel assembly saw some growth, other parts of the renewable supply chain faced tariffs too – notably the steel and aluminum tariffs (Section 232) also imposed by Trump. Those increased costs for mounting structures and trackers used in solar farms, which ironically hurt some U.S. manufacturers of racking/tracker systems by raising their material costs​.

For example, NEXTracker, a U.S.-based maker of solar tracker systems, had higher input costs due to steel tariffs. So the net effect on the broader renewable manufacturing landscape was uneven. In wind energy, tariffs on imported steel and Chinese components raised costs for tower manufacturers and developers, possibly contributing to a dip in new wind farm installations in 2018-2019.

However, the focus here is solar – where the manufacturing outcome can be summed up as: tariffs provided a temporary lifeline and a foothold for a few domestic panel producers, but did not significantly reduce the gap between U.S. production and consumption without further policy support.

 

Effects on Jobs, Investment, and Industry Growth

The tariff policy had complex effects on employment and investment in the U.S. solar industry. By most accounts, the net impact on jobs was negative in the short-to-medium term, because job losses in installation, project development, and supporting sectors outweighed the gains in manufacturing jobs. Solar installation is labor-intensive and had over 10 times more workers than manufacturing did.

Thus, even a modest slowdown in project deployment could translate into significant employment impacts. SEIA’s early projections warned that the tariffs would cost around 23,000 American jobs in 2018 and ultimately around 62,000 fewer solar jobs between 2017 and 2021 compared to if no tariffs were in place​​. In late 2019, nearly two years into the tariff regime, SEIA reported that the industry indeed ended up with tens of thousands fewer jobs than expected: “Solar was the first industry to be hit with this administration’s tariff policy, and now we’re feeling the impacts that we warned against,” said Abigail Ross Hopper, noting the job deficit was on the order of what had been predicted​.

The 62,000 figure (jobs “not created” due to the tariffs) is quite large – for context, the U.S. coal mining industry employs about 50,000 people​. So the opportunity cost in solar jobs was roughly equivalent to wiping out the entire coal mining workforce. These lost jobs mostly represent electricians, construction workers, and salespeople who would have been hired to build and install those 10+ GW of lost solar capacity. The hit was felt nationwide: solar installers in states from California to Mississippi reported reduced hiring or even layoffs when projects were cancelled or delayed.

Manufacturing jobs did increase modestly – perhaps a few thousand direct jobs at panel plants were added. For example, Q CELLS’ Georgia factory hired around 700 workers, JinkoSolar’s Florida plant a few hundred, LG’s Alabama plant a few hundred, etc. First Solar’s expansion added a couple hundred.

Even factoring in supply chain (glass, polymer film, etc.), the manufacturing job gains were a fraction of the installation job losses. SEIA pointed out that 36,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs in solar (out of ~38,000) were in areas like racking, inverters, etc., which rely on a thriving installation market​. Those jobs were put at risk when installations slowed. For instance, an Ohio-based racking manufacturer or a inverter company could see demand drop, forcing them to cut shifts or delay expansion.

This is why SEIA argued the tariffs would “eliminate, not add to, American manufacturing jobs” on net​. The American Clean Power Association (ACP) echoed that by 2022, saying most jobs are in deploying solar, so policies hampering deployment hurt overall employment​​.

Investment followed a similar pattern: a net reduction in capital flow into the solar sector during the tariff period relative to potential. The Reuters analysis in 2019 cited $19 billion in lost investment over 2017–2021 because fewer projects were built​. This includes money not spent on panels (since volume was lower), but also construction expenditures, land leases, and associated economic activity that didn’t occur. Some of that investment likely shifted overseas – for example, foreign panel makers still got business via their Southeast Asian plants (so investment went into those facilities).

Meanwhile, domestic investment in manufacturing, while notable (a few hundred million here and there for factory setups), was much smaller in scale. To put $19 billion in perspective, the entire solar investment in the U.S. in 2018 was about $30 billion; so a significant chunk of potential growth was deferred.

On the flip side, one could argue some investment was redirected into domestic factories that wouldn’t have been spent otherwise – but again, those sums (perhaps $1–2 billion invested in new U.S. factories) are small relative to the project investments lost.

In terms of overall industry growth, the tariffs caused a short-term dip but the industry still grew over the four-year period, just more slowly. Annual solar capacity additions, which had been skyrocketing, saw a slight decline in 2018, modest growth in 2019, then were hit by the pandemic in 2020 (though solar proved resilient and still grew that year), and surged in 2021.

Cumulatively, U.S. solar capacity more than doubled from 2017 to 2021 despite the tariffs, reaching over 100 GWdc by end of 2021. However, analysts estimate it could have been closer to 110–115 GW had tariffs not been in place. The U.S. slipped slightly in global solar installation rankings during the tariff years – China, India, and Europe all expanded faster – but the U.S. remained among the top markets.

Importantly, as soon as stronger policy support arrived (like stable tax credits and the IRA), the U.S. solar market re-accelerated dramatically, showing that the underlying demand was robust.

One area where tariffs arguably helped growth is U.S. solar manufacturing investment – perhaps the one category of investment positively affected. Companies like Q CELLS investing in a new U.S. plant, or First Solar investing in expansion, are examples. Tariff supporters point to these as wins: new factories, new supply chains, and capital expenditures in American communities (e.g., building a factory in Georgia involved tens of millions in construction and equipment spending).

Yet until additional incentives arrived, there was little sign of a broader manufacturing boom. By 2021, U.S. production was still modest and some planned factories (like a proposed plant by SolarTech Universal in Florida) did not materialize.

Another metric is industry momentum and global leadership. The tariffs arguably undermined the U.S. solar industry’s momentum just as it was entering a Solar+ Decade of expected exponential growth​. One could say the policy diverted focus: instead of purely scaling up installations, companies had to devote energy to supply chain gymnastics and policy fights. Some developers diversified into other markets or technologies (for instance, focusing more on wind or storage in 2018-2019) when solar became slightly less attractive due to cost.

This may have caused the U.S. to miss out on a bit of the global solar surge in those years. However, the resilient rebound by 2023-2024 indicates that any slowdown was temporary.

In terms of jobs and equity, it’s worth noting that many of the installation jobs lost or delayed were local blue-collar jobs often in states that were beginning to see solar development (Southeast, Midwest). Meanwhile, the manufacturing jobs gained were concentrated in a few locations (GA, OH, FL). So there were regional winners and losers. States like California and Texas, which have large solar industries, saw slower growth than expected – affecting construction labor and service jobs there – while states like Georgia saw a bump from a new factory.

The tariffs effectively tried to shift jobs from one segment to another, but since the net effect was negative, it created more disruption than net new employment.

By 2025, the solar workforce is again growing robustly, thanks largely to the enormous demand for new installations driven by climate goals and IRA incentives. Many of the “lost” jobs have likely been recuperated as projects that were shelved are now being built. But cumulatively, the industry’s job count in 2020-2021 was lower than it would have been absent tariffs. Future analyses may show whether the manufacturing jobs created endure and multiply (especially with IRA support) to eventually offset the earlier losses. If new factories scale up to tens of thousands of jobs in the mid-2020s, the long-run job equation could balance out differently. That, however, will be attributable to new policies building on the tariff foundation, not the original tariffs alone.

In conclusion, the Trump solar tariffs cost the U.S. solar industry tens of thousands of jobs and billions in investment during their initial term, slowing the previously rapid growth of solar deployments. They did create some new manufacturing activity, but not enough to make up for the broader losses in the supply chain and deployment sectors. The industry’s growth trajectory bent downward slightly because of the tariffs, though not broken, and it has since rebounded with policy adjustments.

Policymakers have learned from this that protecting one segment of an industry can have unintended ripple effects on the larger ecosystem. The hope moving forward is that combining strategic incentives with smart trade measures can yield a more positive sum outcome – boosting manufacturing while still expanding installations and jobs overall.

 

Shifts in Global Competitiveness and Market Dynamics

The tariffs not only impacted the domestic scene but also had ramifications for the U.S. solar industry’s position in the global market and the competitive landscape of solar energy. One immediate global effect was a divergence in solar costs between the United States and other major markets. As described, U.S. solar prices became higher than world averages due to the import duties​. This meant that internationally, the U.S. was somewhat less competitive in attracting solar development capital.

For example, a multinational firm deciding where to invest in utility-scale solar might have found returns more attractive in markets without tariffs (like India or Europe post-2018) because hardware was cheaper there. The EU, notably, chose a different path in 2018 by ending its own anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese panels, explicitly to lower costs and accelerate solar deployment across Europe​. European solar installations surged after 2018, with the continent seeing significant growth as module prices there dropped to record lows. The U.S., by contrast, had a relative handicap.

While the U.S. still grew its solar base, analysts believe growth was slower than it could have been in a free-trade scenario, potentially ceding some leadership in installed capacity and innovation during those years.

In terms of global manufacturing competitiveness, the tariffs underscored the sheer dominance of China and the difficulty of changing that. Even with tariff walls, Chinese companies remained cost leaders – they simply shipped from elsewhere. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand gained global market share as manufacturing centers, essentially as extensions of Chinese competitiveness. This was a boon for those countries’ economies and meant that they, rather than the U.S., moved up in the solar value chain. The U.S. manufacturing that did occur was mostly assembly of imported inputs, so it didn’t challenge Asia’s upstream stronghold. By 2025, China’s grip on solar manufacturing – from polysilicon to modules – has only tightened, with Chinese firms possibly controlling an estimated 90-95% of the global solar supply chain for wafers and cells in addition to modules​. The Trump tariffs alone did not incentivize other regions (like Europe or Africa) to build manufacturing either; China’s scale is so enormous that tariffs in one market just reshuffle exports to others.

There is also a geo-economic dimension. The solar tariffs became one chapter in a broader U.S.-China trade confrontation. They possibly set a precedent for more aggressive trade actions in clean tech that followed, like U.S. tariffs on Chinese wind turbine parts, batteries, and the sanctions over Xinjiang forced labor. In response, China accelerated its domestic clean energy deployment (to soak up production and avoid reliance on exports) and sought new export markets (Belt and Road countries, Latin America, etc.). The U.S.-China “decoupling” in solar may have long-term competitive implications: for instance, China turned inward briefly in 2018, leading to oversupply and price crashes globally​, which ironically aided the adoption of solar in many countries by making it cheaper (except the U.S. where tariffs offset that).

So one could argue the tariffs inadvertently helped other countries get cheaper solar power by diverting Chinese supply to them at low prices.

For U.S. companies, the global dynamics shifted. Exports of U.S.-made solar products did not pick up meaningfully because the U.S. industry was still too small. The tariffs did not directly foster an export-competitive sector – most U.S.-made panels were consumed domestically (or in a few cases exported to Europe/Canada in small volumes). Meanwhile, U.S. companies that rely on global supply chains had to adapt.

Some U.S. solar developers became more internationally savvy in procurement, setting up offices in Singapore or Hong Kong to manage Asian supplier relationships and ensure a steady flow under the tariff quotas. A few began investigating new source countries like India, South Korea, or even Brazil to diversify sourcing (though those remained minor suppliers, with India starting its own tariffs to grow domestic industry).

Global market dynamics also saw other nations responding to the U.S.-China solar dispute. For instance, India imposed its own safeguard tariffs on Chinese and Malaysian panels in 2018, partly taking a cue from the U.S. approach and to protect its nascent manufacturers. That further segmented the global market.

By 2022, India escalated to a 40% basic customs duty on imports and launched big subsidy programs for local production – a much more aggressive stance than the U.S. took. The EU, after years of cheap imports fueling growth, by 2023 also started contemplating new trade measures in response to China’s dominance (such as anti-subsidy probes into Chinese clean tech)​, in effect perhaps validating the concerns that originally drove the Trump tariffs, albeit Europe initially avoided tariffs to speed deployment.

Thus, one could say the Trump solar tariffs were an early harbinger of a broader global push to reconcile climate goals with industrial policy, a tension many regions are now wrestling with.

From a competitiveness standpoint, U.S. solar installation companies had to compete in a market with elevated input costs, which might have slightly reduced their profitability or ability to scale compared to foreign competitors. For example, a solar developer operating in both the U.S. and Europe would find their U.S. projects more expensive, potentially limiting margins stateside.

However, the strong U.S. demand and policy environment (state renewable mandates, etc.) ensured that most competent companies remained profitable; they just managed a higher cost base. U.S. utilities procuring solar through competitive bids saw prices that were higher than they might have been. Some utilities turned to wind or gas for a couple of years if solar didn’t clear price thresholds due to tariffs – affecting competition among energy sources. However, as global prices fell, even tariff-inflated solar became quite competitive by 2020-2021 (solar PPAs hit record lows around $20/MWh in some U.S. regions even with tariffs, thanks to other cost reductions).

So the competitive handicap was somewhat temporary.

One interesting dynamic is that the tariffs gave an edge to certain technologies and companies domestically. For instance, thin-film solar (Cadmium Telluride panels by First Solar) had no tariffs, so First Solar had a cost advantage in the U.S. utility market during 2018-2021. The company likely captured a larger market share of U.S. utility deployments than it would have otherwise, as some developers opted for First Solar modules to avoid tariffs. This in turn supported First Solar’s growth and R&D, making it one of the few non-Chinese manufacturers globally that could hold its own.

Conversely, many Chinese crystalline-silicon panel brands became scarce in the U.S., which might have slightly dented their global sales volumes or brand presence, but they more than compensated elsewhere. Some foreign firms like LG and Panasonic initially benefited (LG even cited the tariffs as a reason to expand in Alabama), but global oversupply and price pressure eventually led LG to exit the market and Panasonic to withdraw from panel manufacturing.

So competitiveness shuffled among manufacturers: those who doubled down on China/Asia production (like Jinko, Trina) versus those who invested in local presence (Q CELLS, First Solar). The latter gained a foothold in the U.S. premium market (e.g. Q CELLS captured a lot of residential module market by advertising U.S.-made panels after 2019).

In terms of innovation, one could argue the tariffs had a mixed effect. They may have marginally slowed innovation by Chinese firms in cost reduction since a chunk of the U.S. market was cordoned off (though they still innovated plenty for other markets). They did encourage some innovation in the U.S. – for instance, companies explored alternative materials or module designs that might circumvent tariffs or lower costs. There was talk of building more factories in low-cost tariff-exempt countries, pushing manufacturing know-how to new places.

But overall, the global center of innovation remained in Asia (China’s R&D in solar is massive). The U.S. did not significantly increase R&D as a result of the tariffs; if anything, some U.S. R&D programs struggled because demand for their tech (like advanced silicon cells) was limited when the market was depressed relative to forecast.

One clear global dynamic is that the U.S. ceded some leadership in deployment for a time. While it focused on domestic industry protection, other countries were rapidly installing solar to meet climate targets. By 2020, China had over 250 GW installed, the EU over 130 GW, whereas the U.S. was around 75 GW. The gap likely would have been narrower without tariffs. This matters because leadership in installations can drive local innovation, workforce expertise, and influence in international standards.

The U.S. remained an important market, but perhaps not as dominant in setting trends (for example, the U.S. was slower to adopt bifacial modules initially due to tariff uncertainty, whereas the rest of the world embraced them quickly; now the U.S. is catching up after bifacial exemption).

In conclusion, the Trump tariffs caused a somewhat inward turn of the U.S. solar market at a time when global solar was booming. The U.S. sacrificed some immediate growth and positioned itself outside the cheapest supply chains, which temporarily lessened its competitiveness and influence in the global solar boom.

However, this was in service of a longer-term goal to build domestic capacity – a goal that arguably required additional measures to realize. The global solar industry continued to be dominated by China and its neighbors, and the tariffs did little to change that hierarchy during 2018-2021. They may have, however, presaged a more protectionist approach that is now becoming part of the global clean energy narrative (with multiple regions seeking to support homegrown industries). The ultimate effect on U.S. global competitiveness will depend on whether the U.S. can leverage the foundation (few plants and the policy experience) to truly build competitive manufacturing at scale.

If the new IRA-driven factories succeed, the U.S. might emerge later this decade with a stronger hand in the global solar supply chain – essentially playing the long game to competitiveness. But as of 2025, the tariffs alone achieved limited shifts in the global balance; China remains the solar manufacturing superpower, and the U.S. remains a heavyweight in deployment but not the heaviest.

 

Company-Level Effects: Winners, Losers, and Strategic Shifts

Drilling down to individual companies, the tariffs produced a clear divide between those positioned to benefit and those harmed. On the winners’ side were U.S.-based solar manufacturers (and a few foreign firms with U.S. plants) and certain niche players; on the losers’ side were many downstream installation firms and some foreign manufacturers shut out of the U.S. market.

Benefited Companies:

First Solar, Inc.: First Solar was arguably the biggest corporate winner from the tariffs. As an American company with manufacturing in Ohio and Malaysia (using thin-film CdTe technology exempt from the silicon-specific tariffs), First Solar suddenly found its main competitors – low-cost Chinese silicon module makers – facing steep import penalties. This allowed First Solar to raise or maintain its prices closer to the tariff-inflated market price, improving its margins, while still undercutting tariffed imports.

The company’s stock jumped around the tariff announcement and remained strong throughout 2018. First Solar quickly announced a new U.S. factory (in addition to its existing Ohio plant), citing confidence in the market’s stability​. Even after the Biden tariff adjustments, First Solar was vocal that any weakening of tariffs (like the bifacial exemption) was bad for them​ – an indicator of how important the trade protection was to their competitive edge. In February 2022, news that bifacial panels would be exempt led to a slight dip in First Solar shares​, as investors saw that as eroding First Solar’s relative advantage. Nevertheless, First Solar has grown to be the largest U.S. solar panel manufacturer by far, and it credits the supportive trade environment for enabling some of that growth.

By 2025, buoyed by additional IRA incentives, First Solar is expanding further. Financially, the tariffs likely added hundreds of millions to First Solar’s revenue over 2018-21 by allowing higher selling prices than a free-market would have.

Hanwha Q CELLS (and other foreign firms with U.S. plants): Q CELLS, a South Korean-owned firm, made a strategic move to build a huge panel assembly plant in Georgia in 2019, which proved prescient. With that facility, Q CELLS could label its panels “Made in USA” and avoid tariffs, giving it a pricing advantage in the residential and commercial segments where it largely operates. Q CELLS quickly captured significant U.S. market share in residential solar modules post-2019.

Its investment created about 700 jobs and by 2020 it was celebrating being a top supplier in the U.S. That success has led Q CELLS to plan even bigger expansions (announced in 2023, a fully integrated supply chain in the U.S.). For Q CELLS, the tariffs were an impetus to commit to the U.S. market physically. Similarly, JinkoSolar built a smaller Florida plant – it gained the ability to supply utility projects without full tariffs (though its scale was limited). LG Solar initially benefited by producing in Alabama – its premium panels could target the high-end U.S. rooftop market.

However, as mentioned, LG decided in 2022 to exit solar entirely amid stiff competition and possibly frustrations with a policy environment that, beyond tariffs, wasn’t enough to keep it profitable in solar. SunPower Corp. managed to turn the tariffs to partial advantage by acquiring SolarWorld’s U.S. factory, which earned it goodwill and an avenue to supply some product tariff-free. SunPower also obtained an exclusion for its unique imported panels, easing its cost issues.

Overall, companies that invested in U.S. production or had unique tech saw relative benefits in the tariff period.

Auxin Solar and small domestic module makers: Auxin Solar (California) and a handful of other very small U.S. module producers were essentially kept afloat by the tariffs. Though their output is tiny (tens of MW), the tariffs gave them a price umbrella. Auxin’s CEO was one of the most vocal proponents of extending and tightening tariffs​. These companies could charge higher prices than Chinese imports and still find some customers (often for niche projects needing Buy American compliance).

However, even with tariffs, they struggled due to lack of scale. Auxin ended up pivoting to advocacy, filing the circumvention case. If not for the tariffs, firms like Auxin likely would have closed; with tariffs, they survived and are hoping to grow under new incentives.

Domestic materials providers (mixed): Some U.S. suppliers of raw materials (like polysilicon makers Hemlock Semiconductor and REC Silicon) hoped the tariffs and related trade talks would reopen exports to China or spur U.S. wafer production.

While that didn’t happen during 2018-21, by 2023 REC Silicon is restarting production, not because tariffs fixed things, but because IRA incentives might finally create domestic wafer demand. So indirectly, tariffs highlighted the issue, but only now are those upstream players possibly benefiting, as the U.S. pushes for a whole supply chain.

Negatively Affected Companies:

Solar Project Developers and EPCs: Companies whose core business is developing solar farms (e.g., NextEra Energy’s renewable division, Cypress Creek, 8minute Solar Energy, sPower) were hit by higher costs and project delays. Cypress Creek’s aforementioned cancellation of 1.5 GW was an extreme example​. NextEra (one of the largest renewable developers) said in early 2018 that tariffs would raise their project costs and they might prioritize wind projects or delay some solar.

Indeed, some firms pivoted to more wind in 2018-2019 as wind turbine costs were comparatively lower (though turbines had steel tariffs to contend with). EPC (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) firms that build solar farms, like Blattner Energy or Swinerton Renewable, faced reduced project volume in 2018 and parts of 2019, meaning less work and pressure to lower margins. Their profitability likely dipped until the market recovered and backlog refilled.

However, post-2020 they saw record activity, so it was a temporary slump.

Residential Solar Installers: Large national installers like Sunrun, Vivint Solar (now part of Sunrun), and Tesla’s solar division publicly opposed the tariffs and warned of job cuts. Sunrun’s CEO Lynn Jurich argued the tariff “would harm U.S. solar energy jobs”​. In practice, Sunrun managed through the tariff period by adjusting prices slightly and emphasizing that solar was still economical. Its stock initially fell around tariff implementation but recovered as the company continued to grow installations at double-digit rates annually.

The impact was more acute on smaller installers who operate with thinner margins and less purchasing power; some may have lost competitive edge or had to postpone hiring. Tesla’s solar roof product, already expensive, became even less cost-competitive with a tariff on conventional panels (though Tesla was also using some panels made in Buffalo).

Overall, while residential companies survived, their customer acquisition might have been a bit slower in cost-sensitive markets. Notably, Sunrun and others saw strong growth in 2019 and beyond, indicating they weathered it.

However, their cost of goods was higher, possibly squeezing gross margins until they passed costs through. In earnings calls, Sunrun indicated that despite tariffs, they continued to invest and that panel costs were only one element of value per customer​. Still, it’s likely their profitability was a few percentage points lower than it would have been sans tariffs.

Chinese and Foreign Manufacturers (with no U.S. footprint): The most directly hit were Chinese solar manufacturing giants like Trina Solar, JA Solar, Canadian Solar, LONGi, etc. They effectively lost direct access to the U.S. market after 2018 (they had already lost a lot after 2012 AD duties, but some still shipped via third countries or high-efficiency niche products).

These companies had to spend capital to build or expand facilities in Southeast Asia to serve U.S. customers. Some, like Jinko and JA Solar, complied and invested in Vietnam/Malaysia plants. Others that didn’t have that capacity likely ceded some U.S. market share. Their overall sales might not have dropped (because global demand was rising and they sold elsewhere), but the U.S. was a higher-priced market they would have liked to supply.

The tariffs also prevented newer entrants or aggressive pricing moves in the U.S., which those companies could have done. Canadian Solar (despite the name, a major China-linked firm) possibly was hurt because it couldn’t send Chinese-made panels nor did it have a U.S. assembly (though it did have some capacity in SE Asia). These companies publicly opposed the U.S. tariffs and some took part in legal challenges via importers.

However, given their global scale, the U.S. tariffs were a manageable setback; they diversified markets and waited it out. Many of them are now investing in building factories in the U.S. due to IRA incentives, showing they still value the U.S. market if economics allow.

U.S. Poly and Equipment Firms: U.S. polysilicon producers like Hemlock and REC Silicon were collateral damage of the earlier trade war, not directly the 201 tariffs, but their plight remained through the Trump years. China’s retaliatory tariff on U.S. polysilicon (which started in 2014) meant they couldn’t sell into China, and since there was no U.S. wafer industry, they had no customers.

The Section 201 proclamation even mentioned seeking resolution on Chinese polysilicon tariffs​, but no deal happened. So companies like REC Silicon shut down production in 2019 and laid off workers. They effectively saw zero benefit from the solar tariffs and continued to suffer until new developments after 2021.

Balance-of-System Manufacturers: As mentioned, companies making mounting structures or trackers (e.g., Array Technologies, NEXTracker) had to pay more for steel due to separate tariffs, which increased their costs. They may have had to raise prices, potentially reducing demand for their product if some solar farms were canceled.

In 2018, Array and NEXTracker both noted increased steel costs in their pricing. Inverters from China were subject to Section 301 tariffs of 25%, affecting companies like Huawei (which then exited the U.S. inverter market) and even U.S. companies that sourced components from China. Enphase Energy, a U.S. microinverter manufacturer, had most of its manufacturing in China in 2018; the Section 301 tariffs on electronics hurt its margins until it moved production to other countries.

Enphase had to do a quick supply chain shift to avoid the China tariffs. Its stock was volatile in 2018 partly for that reason, though the company ultimately thrived by diversifying manufacturing to Mexico.

In essence, companies that could adapt their supply chains or were domestically based tended to cope or benefit, whereas those reliant on cheap imports to the U.S. were squeezed. Many installation companies adopted new procurement strategies; many foreign manufacturers built workarounds. Companies with unique positions (like First Solar) capitalized on policy shelter.

One can point out that after a few years, the market shook out: some weaker players (e.g., Suniva, SolarWorld’s cell production) disappeared, while stronger ones with global reach persisted. By 2021, the U.S. solar sector was dominated by a mix of surviving firms: large installers like Sunrun, resilient developers like NextEra, and a handful of manufacturers (First Solar, Q CELLS).

The tariffs arguably consolidated the industry a bit, possibly aiding bigger players who had the resources to navigate the challenges. Smaller installers might have gone under or been acquired in part due to thinner margins.

Stock market reactions at key points reflected these dynamics: Solar manufacturing stocks (First Solar, SunPower at the time) jumped on the tariff news in 2018​. Downstream-heavy stocks (some yieldcos or installers) initially fell but recovered as worst fears didn’t fully materialize. In 2022, when Biden extended but eased tariffs, First Solar’s stock dipped, while developer sentiments improved. With the onset of IRA incentives (outside tariff scope but relevant), by late 2022 solar manufacturing stocks surged (First Solar hit multi-year highs), as did installation stocks (Sunrun etc.) on growth prospects – showing that pro-growth incentives are a rising tide lifting all boats, versus tariffs which created divided fortunes.

 

Perspectives from Policymakers, Industry Experts, and Trade Groups

The debate around the solar tariffs has been intense and evolving, with stakeholders offering differing perspectives on their necessity and impact.

Policymakers in the Trump Administration: From the White House and USTR, the tariffs were framed as a clear win for American industry and workers. President Trump himself touted the solar tariffs as a way to restore U.S. manufacturing, often linking it to his broader agenda of confronting China’s trade practices. USTR Lighthizer emphasized that the cases were brought by American businesses and vetted by the ITC, and that the action showed the administration “will always defend American workers… and businesses”​.

The administration’s narrative was that cheap imports (particularly from China) had unfairly undercut U.S. producers, and relief was needed to rebuild capacity. Energy Secretary (at the time) Rick Perry similarly echoed that the tariffs would “boost domestic manufacturing of solar equipment” and create jobs in that segment, while downplaying potential negative effects.

However, within the Republican party, there were mixed views: a group of Republican Senators from states with growing solar industries (like South Carolina, North Carolina) actually petitioned President Trump for an exemption to the tariffs for certain high-voltage panels used by their utilities​. They worried the tariffs would raise energy costs and kill projects in their states. This showed an unusual intra-party split, pitting the traditional pro-business, free-market Republicans against the administration’s protectionist stance.

Policymakers in the Biden Administration: The Biden team, inheriting this policy, had to balance conflicting objectives. President Biden’s decision to extend the tariffs (albeit eased) in 2022 reflects a political compromise.

On one hand, he has strong climate goals which argue for rapid deployment of solar (which cheap imports facilitate); on the other hand, he and many Democrats support labor unions and domestic manufacturing which argue for protecting and creating American clean energy jobs. Biden’s statement upon vetoing Congress’s attempt to re-impose tariffs in 2023 encapsulated his stance: he argued that immediately restoring tariffs on Southeast Asian imports would “create deep uncertainty” in the solar industry and “bet against American innovation”​.

Essentially, Biden suggested that American manufacturing can ramp up given a bit of time (hence the two-year pause) and that suddenly yanking away panel supplies would hurt broader climate efforts. Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV) and other Democrats sided with this view, saying the pause on tariffs was needed to keep projects moving and workers employed in installations. In contrast, some Democrats from manufacturing-heavy regions (like Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio, Rep. Dan Kildee of Michigan) argued the pause undermined domestic producers, “rewarding the worst behavior” (circumvention) and making the U.S. more reliant on foreign supply chains​. Kildee’s stance, for example, was that failing to enforce trade rules would disadvantage companies following the law (i.e., U.S. manufacturers) and let China and others exploit loopholes​.

Ultimately, Biden’s veto in 2023 upheld the pause, aligning with developers and climate advocates. This policy nuance shows Democrats trying to align climate policy with industrial policy – not an easy task. Going forward, Biden officials often emphasize that the IRA’s incentives, rather than tariffs, will drive the manufacturing scale-up, reflecting perhaps a preference for carrots over sticks but still keeping some trade guardrails.

Industry Trade Groups:

Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA): As the largest solar trade association (mostly representing installers, developers, and also some manufacturers downstream), SEIA was strongly opposed to the tariffs from day one. SEIA consistently highlighted the negative impacts: job losses, project cancellations, higher consumer costs​​. SEIA’s leaders gave numerous interviews and testimonies quantifying the harm (the 62,000 jobs and 10.5 GW lost figure is from a SEIA-commissioned analysis)​.

They argued that “tariffs in this case will not create adequate manufacturing… they will create a crisis in a part of our economy that has been thriving”​. Over time, SEIA adapted its strategy; by 2021, rather than solely pushing to end tariffs, SEIA also pushed for domestic manufacturing incentives (the Solar Manufacturing for America Act), implicitly acknowledging the political reality that some domestic manufacturing support was needed. SEIA’s position became: we support building domestic manufacturing through incentives, not harmful tariffs. SEIA fiercely opposed the Auxin circumvention petition, mobilizing more than 200 solar companies to sign a letter urging Commerce to dismiss it​. SEIA portrayed that petition as an existential threat that could cost tens of thousands more jobs if new tariffs were applied.

This lobbying contributed to Biden’s unusual step of pausing tariff enforcement. SEIA praised Biden’s pause as saving “tens of thousands of solar jobs” and keeping progress toward climate goals. In essence, SEIA acts as the voice of the broader solar ecosystem prioritizing growth and deployment over protectionism.

American Clean Power Association (ACP): ACP (which includes wind, solar, storage companies, including many utilities and developers) similarly critiqued tariffs. ACP in 2022 said extending tariffs would “threaten Biden’s clean energy goals”​. After Biden’s tariff extension with modifications, ACP praised the exclusion of bifacial panels as “a win for jobs and… climate agenda”​, signaling relief that the administration listened to developers. ACP’s stance generally is aligned with SEIA’s: focus on accelerating project deployment and use incentives for domestic manufacturing rather than blunt tariffs.

Domestic Manufacturers and Pro-Tariff Voices: A smaller coalition of domestic solar module manufacturers, sometimes under names like the Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) or ad-hoc groups like Solar Manufacturers for America, provided the counterpoint. Companies like First Solar, Auxin Solar, Suniva (in absentia) and some U.S. polysilicon producers formed a narrative that tariffs were essential to give American manufacturers a chance.

For instance, First Solar’s CEO has often argued that China’s heavily subsidized industry must be met with U.S. trade action, or else “we cede the future of energy to China.” Auxin Solar and others wrote op-eds emphasizing that without tariffs the Chinese would dump panels to kill any U.S. factory attempts – a classic infant industry protection argument. They also pointed to national security, saying a domestic solar manufacturing base is important for energy independence. This group was pleased with Trump’s actions and lobbied the Biden administration hard to extend tariffs (which they succeeded in, partially)​. They were dismayed by the bifacial exemption – calling it a loophole – and by the tariff pause.

Statements from Auxin Solar illustrated their perspective: Auxin’s CEO publicly said companies circumventing via Southeast Asia were engaging in unfair trade, and that enforcing tariffs is about “fair and sustainable trade throughout the whole solar energy value chain” benefiting U.S. producers, workers, and consumers in the long run​​.

This viewpoint holds that short-term pain (higher costs, slower deployment) is worth the long-term gain of a robust domestic industry. It’s a minority voice in the solar industry at large, but it resonates with some policymakers (especially those from manufacturing regions or with hawkish views on China).

Utilities and Energy Buyers: Many electric utilities, who procure solar for their resource needs, weighed in via regulatory comments or Congress. Generally, utilities have been supportive of lower solar costs (since they pass cost savings to ratepayers) and thus not enthusiastic about tariffs raising prices. Some utility commissioners in states like Arizona and North Carolina wrote to the Trump administration in 2017 urging them to consider the broader economic impacts before imposing tariffs. After tariffs, utilities adjusted their plans – a few IRPs (Integrated Resource Plans) saw slight reductions in planned solar build in near-term years. But publicly, utilities mostly let SEIA/ACP lead the fight.

One exception was the New England Ratepayers Association, which oddly supported the tariffs on the argument that Chinese subsidies were distorting the market (though this group is known for opposing net metering too, suggesting an anti-solar bent).

Experts and Economists: Many energy economists and think-tanks criticized the tariffs as an inefficient policy. Analyses from universities and firms like Wood Mackenzie reinforced that tariffs would slow deployment and have high costs per job saved. A Yale University study (2020) quantified welfare impacts, finding the tariffs led to higher prices and environmental costs that outweighed benefits to the small manufacturing sector​.

The conservative Heritage Foundation also critiqued the tariffs, surprisingly aligning with environmentalists in saying it was government interference raising energy costs. On the other hand, some experts in the fledgling field of “climate industrial policy” argued that some protection could be warranted to ensure a domestic clean energy supply chain for the future, especially given China’s dominance and the strategic importance of renewables. This debate intensified with supply chain shocks and geopolitical tensions.

By 2025, expert opinion has shifted somewhat to a middle ground: recognizing that blindly relying on ultra-cheap imports has vulnerabilities, but also that heavy tariffs can undermine clean energy goals. The consensus among most economists is that direct subsidies (like those in the IRA) are a more effective way to build domestic industry than broad tariffs which act as a blunt tax on the entire sector. The experience of 2018-2021 is often cited in policy papers as a case study of the drawbacks of tariffs in the clean energy context – essentially a caution that tariffs slowed deployment more than they spurred manufacturing.

In Congressional hearings, you’d hear these contrasting perspectives: e.g., Senator Martin Heinrich (D-NM) said in 2022 that “the solar tariffs were a mistake” in hindering progress on climate. Meanwhile, Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) (a free trader normally, but from Ohio where First Solar is a major employer) supported extending tariffs to help level the field with China.

Finally, looking at public sentiment and environmental groups: Environmental NGOs generally opposed the tariffs, viewing them as a hindrance to clean energy adoption. The Sierra Club, for instance, decried any policy that makes renewable energy more expensive. They pushed for solutions that grow domestic jobs through investment, not by throttling imports. Some labor unions, however, were more pro-tariff (e.g., United Steelworkers supported the solar tariffs, seeing them analogous to steel tariffs, to create manufacturing jobs). This sometimes put unions at odds with environmentalists within the left-of-center coalition.

In essence, perspectives on the solar tariffs encapsulated a broader tension between two visions of how to achieve a clean energy transition: one prioritizing immediate deployment with global supply chains, and another prioritizing building domestic industries even if it means a slower ramp-up. Over time, the conversation has evolved to seek a balance – using massive investment (like the IRA) to reduce the trade-off. As we stand in 2025, many stakeholders have coalesced around the idea that the U.S. can both deploy and manufacture via smart policy, though the proof will be in execution. The Trump-era tariffs are seen by many as a blunt first attempt at this puzzle – one that yielded some benefits but also significant costs, and thus offers lessons for the future.

 

Conclusion

The Trump administration’s solar tariffs marked a pivotal experiment in using trade policy to shape the trajectory of a clean energy industry. Over the span of 2018 to 2025, these tariffs have had far-reaching impacts on the U.S. solar market, influencing everything from project economics and installation rates to global supply chains and domestic manufacturing strategy.

In review, the tariffs succeeded in one narrow respect: they provided breathing room for a handful of solar panel factories to open or expand in the United States, modestly increasing domestic capacity and employment in module assembly​. This intervention prevented the complete loss of U.S. solar manufacturing know-how and created a toehold for future growth.

However, the tariffs also came with significant trade-offs. They temporarily raised the cost of solar energy in the United States, contributing to the delay or cancellation of numerous projects – on the order of 10+ GW of capacity and nearly $20 billion in private investment forfeited​​. The utility-scale solar segment, in particular, felt the brunt of higher prices, with developers postponing projects and shifting timelines to wait out the tariff period​.

As a result, solar deployment and the jobs associated with it grew more slowly than they otherwise would have, especially in the first years of the tariffs​. By SEIA’s estimates, tens of thousands of American solar jobs were lost or not created because of the tariffs’ drag on growth​.

Meanwhile, the global dynamics of solar supply barely budged. Chinese and other Asian manufacturers adapted by routing products through tariff-exempt or lower-tariff countries, ensuring that the U.S. remained heavily import-dependent​​. The solar supply chain simply recalibrated around the tariffs, with Southeast Asia emerging as the dominant source of panels for the U.S. market​. This maintained the flow of equipment but also kept the U.S. tethered to foreign supplies – a vulnerability that became evident during subsequent trade disputes and the pandemic.

In effect, the tariffs did not achieve their broader aim of U.S. supply chain self-sufficiency, though they perhaps laid a foundation upon which new policies (like tax credits for manufacturing) are now trying to build.

From a policy perspective, the solar tariffs sparked an important dialogue about how to reconcile climate objectives with domestic economic goals. Policymakers have grappled with that dual mandate: the Trump administration favored aggressive tariffs to jolt manufacturing, while the Biden administration has leaned toward a mix of moderated tariffs and significant incentives to encourage domestic production without stalling deployment​​.

The evolving consensus appears to be that a balanced approach is needed – one that fosters U.S. manufacturing capacity through direct support and targeted procurement (the “carrots”), while using trade measures more selectively to prevent egregious unfair trade (the “sticks”). The experience of the 2018 tariffs demonstrated the limitations of tariffs alone; moving forward, the U.S. is complementing trade policy with industrial policy. As Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm remarked in 2021, “we can walk and chew gum at the same time” – meaning the nation can deploy solar rapidly and build factories, provided the right suite of policies.

Industry stakeholders reflect a range of views shaped by their interests. Solar developers and installers largely decried the tariffs for undercutting one of America’s fastest-growing sectors and costing jobs​. Their focus has been on keeping solar affordable and accessible, which aligns with urgent climate action.

Manufacturers and labor groups, however, voiced that unchecked imports had stunted an entire domestic industry, and thus some intervention was justified to correct the imbalance​. Both perspectives have merit: the former emphasizes short-term growth and consumer benefit, the latter long-term strategic capacity.

Experts note that the ideal outcome would be to achieve both goals – and indeed, by 2025 the U.S. is attempting just that, using the Inflation Reduction Act to supercharge clean energy deployment and local manufacturing. Recent developments include a wave of announcements for new solar component factories across the country (ingots in Alabama, wafers in Georgia, cells in Texas, modules in Ohio and Arizona, to name a few) which suggest that the vision of a domestic solar supply chain might finally materialize later this decade. If it does, it will owe something to the groundwork laid by tariffs (which signaled long-term market viability for manufacturing) but even more to the massive financial incentives and certainty provided by new legislation.

In the end, the impact of the Trump solar tariffs on the U.S. renewable energy market is a story of trade-offs and course corrections. The tariffs gave domestic manufacturing a lifeline but at a notable cost to the speed and cost-effectiveness of solar deployment. They exposed the fragility of supply chains and prompted emergency actions to keep the industry on track (such as Biden’s tariff pause to avert a crisis in 2022​).

Importantly, they pushed the industry and government to innovate in the policy arena – to find better solutions to achieve energy security without compromising growth. The U.S. solar industry of 2025 is larger and more robust than it was in 2018, but likely slightly behind where it could have been absent the tariffs​.

Yet, it is also arguably in a stronger position to expand manufacturing now than it would have been if imports had entirely wiped out domestic producers. Whether the tariffs are judged “worth it” may depend on what happens in the latter half of the 2020s: if the U.S. manages to create a thriving solar manufacturing sector and still meet its renewable energy targets, the early protectionist growing pains might be seen as a contributing step. If not, they may be remembered mainly as a well-intentioned but blunt policy that hampered an industry during a crucial period of growth.

One clear lesson from this period is that consistency and clarity in policy are vital for industries like solar that have long project timelines and thin margins. The back-and-forth of exclusions, extensions, and investigations created uncertainty that was itself costly. As of 2025, industry experts call for a stable environment: now that long-term manufacturing incentives are in place and a path beyond the temporary tariff pause will need to be decided, businesses seek predictability.

The solar sector is poised for enormous expansion in the U.S., driven by economics (solar is now one of the cheapest energy sources) and policy (clean energy goals). Tariffs remain one tool in the toolbox, but the experience of 2018-2021 suggests they must be wielded with caution and complemented by other measures to ensure the overall health of the renewable energy market.

In conclusion, the Trump administration tariffs on solar panels had a profound but double-edged impact: they provided a measure of protection that jump-started some U.S. manufacturing, yet simultaneously increased costs and impeded the otherwise rapid growth of solar power in the United States.

The consequences were felt across utility-scale and residential markets, project costs and timelines, and the makeup of global supply chains. They influenced company strategies and spawned heated debate among policymakers, industry groups, and experts about the best path forward.

As of 2025, the United States is incorporating the lessons learned – aiming to encourage domestic solar production through investment and innovation, while keeping a steady flow of projects to meet climate ambitions. The solar tariffs chapter thus stands as a case study in balancing economic and environmental priorities, illustrating the challenges and trade-offs in nurturing a homegrown renewable energy industry within a globalized market.

 

 

 

 

---

External References

1. Reuters – “Roaring U.S. solar market hit by higher import costs”
   https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/roaring-us-solar-market-hit-by-higher-import-costs-2024-12-05/
2. The Guardian – “Will global climate action be a casualty of Trump’s tariffs?”
   https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/apr/11/global-climate-action-casualty-trump-tariffs
3. AP News – “Could Trump’s tariffs slow emissions? Sure, experts say, but at great cost overall”
   https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-greenhouse-gas-emissions-wind-solar-carbon-dioxide-bf69fb8152a4f53dec727cb6cce55daa
4. Forbes – “Trump’s Tariffs May Dim Solar Sector’s Future as Energy Demand Spikes”
   https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2025/04/01/trumps-tariffs-may-dim-solar-sectors-future-as-energy-demand-spikes/
5. SEIA (Solar Energy Industries Association) – “Solar Tariff Impacts”
   https://seia.org/news/solar-tariff-impacts/
6. CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) – “China and the Impact of ‘Liberation Day’ Tariffs”
   https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-impact-liberation-day-tariffs
7. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) – “Solar, battery storage to lead new U.S. generating capacity additions”
   https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64586
8. Wood Mackenzie – “US Solar Market Insight”
   https://www.woodmac.com/industry/power-and-renewables/us-solar-market-insight/
9. Columbia University – “Trade and the Clean Energy Transition”
   https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/initiatives/trade-clean-energy-transition/
10. U.S. International Trade Commission – “Section 201 – Imported Solar Cells and Modules”
    https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-201-investigations/investigation-no-ta-201-75-cspv-cells
11. Biden Administration – “FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Takes Action to Strengthen American Solar Manufacturing and Protect Manufacturers and Workers from China’s Unfair Trade Practices”
    https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/16/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-takes-action-to-strengthen-american-solar-manufacturing-and-protect-manufacturers-and-workers-from-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/
12. Solar Foundation – “Solar Jobs Census”
    https://irecusa.org/programs/solar-jobs-census/
13. SEIA – “Factsheet Archives”
    https://seia.org/resource-type/fact-sheet/
14. Utility Dive – “First Solar, QCells and 5 other solar manufacturers seek import tariffs”
    https://www.utilitydive.com/news/first-solar-qcells-solar-manufacturers-petition-tariffs/714264/
15. U.S. Department of Commerce – “Department of Commerce Issues Final Determination of Circumvention Inquiries”
    https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2023/08/department-commerce-issues-final-determination-circumvention-inquiries
16. U.S. Congress – “USITC Releases Midterm Report Concerning Developments Within the Global Safeguard Investigation on Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells”
    https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2024/er0206_64835.htm
17. Industry Earnings Calls – “US Solar Market Insight: 2024 year-in-review”
    https://www.woodmac.com/reports/power-markets-us-solar-market-insight-2024-year-in-review-150361048/